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INCOMPLETE TRANSFER TAX REPEAL:
SHOULD THE GIFT TAX SURVIVE?
Henry J. Lischer, Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
I have been invited to provide a response to the article of Professor
Dodge.1 Professor Dodge's article has prompted me to think further
about an issue related to, but not directly raised in, his article: the
apparent inconsistency of retention of the gift tax in an otherwise trans-
fer-tax-free environment as a result of 2001 legislation that repealed (af-
ter December 31, 2009) the estate tax and the generation-skipping
transfer tax.2 In the relatively limited time allowed for preparation of this
comment, I have been able to identify, but not fully develop or evaluate
(let alone vet), some of the issues associated with this seemingly incon-
gruent retention of the gift tax.
I provide below a brief review of events leading up to the 2001 legisla-
tion that eventually repeals the estate tax and the generation-skipping
transfer tax. Congress chose to retain the gift tax, however, and retention
of the gift tax was due, at least in part, to some widely discussed allega-
tions that the absence of a gift tax would encourage income-shifting trans-
actions that would lead to significant federal income tax revenue losses. I
review the income-shifting techniques that have been proffered as viable
if there were no gift tax. Thereafter, I discuss possible methods of com-
bating inappropriate income shifting within the income tax, rather than
relying on the gift tax.
* Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University.
1. See Joseph M. Dodge, Comparing a Reformed Estate Tax with an Accessions Tax
and an Income-Inclusion System, and Abandoning the Generation-Skipping Tax, 56 SMU
L. REV. 551 (2003).
2. The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-
16 § 501, 115 Stat. 38, 69. Because this legislation substantially reduced federal tax reve-
nues, and in order to comply with other budget legislation previously adopted by the Con-
gress, all of the transfer tax provisions of the 2001 legislation do not apply after December
31, 2010. Id. § 901(a)(2), at 115 Stat. 150. Accordingly, in the unlikely event that no fur-
ther legislation is enacted into law, the Internal Revenue Code provisions changed by the




A. ROLE OF TRANSFER TAXES
Transfer taxes, in at least some political systems, have been part of the
human condition for a very long time; they date back to 700 B.C. in
Egypt, and to Caesar Augustus in Rome.3 Transfer taxes have been pre-
sent in the United States since 1797 in various forms and at various
times.4 The modern estate tax first was enacted without a gift tax, 5 but
such an estate-tax-only tax system largely assures that decedents will die
poor by making lifetime tax-free gifts. Eventually Congress was per-
suaded that a gift tax was necessary to assure the effectiveness of the
estate tax.6 The initial adoption of a gift tax in the United States was to
serve explicitly as a backstop to the estate tax, but interestingly for pur-
poses of this article, it was to serve as a backstop to the income tax as
well.7
Recent years have seen Congress approve legislation to repeal the
transfer tax system, 8 but President Clinton vetoed the legislation,9 and
Congress did not override the veto.10 The election of President George
W. Bush in 2000 created a new political scene, and congressional deliber-
ations over transfer tax repeal began again with the active support of the
Bush White House, which had declared repeal of the "death tax" as its
top domestic priority. The stunning success of the 2001 repeal effort is a
case study in the very effective exercise of political power by a very small
but influential segment of the population (approximately two percent of
all estates were subject to the estate tax before the repeal legislation).1"
The supporters of the transfer tax system eventually conceded the need to
3. Tom Herman, A Change in Death & Taxes? Debating the Options for an Estate-Tax
Overhaul, WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 2001, at C1.
4. Id.
5. The estate tax was enacted by Revenue Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-271, 39 Stat.
756, 777.
6. The first federal gift tax was enacted by the Revenue Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-
179, § 319 et seq., 43 Stat. 253, 313. The current gift tax was enacted by the Revenue Act of
1932, Pub. L. No. 72-154, § 501 et seq., 47 Stat. 169, 245 (1932).
7. See Wendy C. Gerzog, Contingencies and the Gift Tax, 93 TAX NOTES 977, 983-84
n.80 (2001); John Buckley, Estate and Gift Taxes: What Will Congress Do Next?, 91 TAX
NOTES 2069, 2070 (2001) [hereinafter Buckley, Estate and Gift Taxes]; John Buckley, Trans-
fer Tax Repeal Proposals: Implications for the Income Tax, 90 TAX NOTES 539 (2001) (re-
ferring to Chair of House Ways and Means Committee in 1924, when Congress was
considering adoption of the modern gift tax, stating that gift tax was a backstop to the
income tax) [hereinafter Buckley, Transfer Tax Repeal Proposals].
8. Death Tax Elimination Act of 2000, H.R. 8, 106th Cong. § 1 (2000); Taxpayer Re-
fund and Relief Act of 1999, H.R. 2488, 106th Cong. § 601 (1999).
9. Death Tax Elimination Act of 2000 - Veto Message from the President of the
United States, 146 CONG. REC. H7240 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 2000); Taxpayer Refund and Re-
lief Act of 1999 - Veto Message from the President of the United States, 145 CONG. REC.
H8613 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1999).
10. 146 CONG. REC. H7335 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 2000) (Vote Roll No. 458, failing to
override veto 274-157-4); 145 CONG. REC. H8614-8621 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1999) (sending
the 1999 veto to committee).
11. See Joel Friedman & Lee Andrew, Estate Tax Repeal Would be Costly, Yet Benefit
Only a Few, 95 TAX NOTES 1984, 1987-88 (2002).
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restrict the scope of the transfer taxes (by increasing the exemption
amounts), but by then the proponents of repeal had sufficient momentum
and power to reject the attempts to restrict the reach of the estate tax. In
retrospect, the supporters of the transfer tax system erred in letting the
estate tax exemption amount become so relatively small that the estate
tax was perceived as threatening the middle class and virtually each farm
and ranch in the country.
B. ROLE OF ARTICLES ALLEGING INCOME SHIFTING POTENTIAL
As the congressional consideration of transfer tax repeal was under-
way, several widely discussed articles and news reports asserted that (1)
significant income shifting would be possible in a transfer-tax-free envi-
ronment and (2) the income shifting would generate significant revenue
losses to the federal income tax.' 2 As discussed more fully below, the
articles played a significant role in the congressional consideration of
transfer tax repeal.' 3
1. Background on Income Shifting
Before addressing the income-shifting techniques described in the arti-
cles, it must be conceded that certain types of income shifting have long
been permitted under the Internal Revenue Code. Shifting of personal
service income generally is not permitted, 14 and the shifting of income
from property to a person, not the owner of the property, generally is not
permitted.' 5 Post-transfer income from the property and any post-trans-
fer accrued gain do not involve income shifting because the income or
gain is taxed to the person who owns the property when the income or
gain accrues.
Pre-transfer accrued gain is different. Such gain theoretically should be
taxed to the transferor because the transferor is the owner when the gain
accrues, but shifting of such pre-transfer accrued gain long has been per-
mitted in a gift transfer. A gift transfer generally is not a realizing event
as to the donor,16 and § 102 provides that receipt of the gift is income-tax-
12. See generally Jonathan G. Blattmachr & Mitchell M. Gans, Wealth Transfer Tax
Repeal. Some Thoughts on Policy and Planning, 90 TAX No-rs 393, 396-97 (2001), re-
printed in 54 NAT'L TAX J. 569, 574-76 (2001); Buckley, Transfer Tax Repeal Proposals,
supra note 7, at 539-40; David Cay Johnston, Questions Raised on New Bush Plan to End
Estate Tax, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2001, at Al. See also Attorney's Testimony at W&M
Hearing on Bush Tax Relief, 2001 TAX NOTES TODAY 58-63 (2001).
13. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.b.
14. See generally Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 115 (1930).
15. See generally Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 115-17 (1940).
16. See Evangelista v. Comm'r, 629 F.2d 1218, 1221-22 (7th Cir. 1980) ("Neither
[Crane nor Old Colony Trust] suggests that a gift may be a taxable disposition to the donor.
No other provision of the Internal Revenue Code makes a gift taxable to the donor. While
there is no section specifically excluding any value accruing to the donor in a pure gift
situation, indications are that there are no income tax consequences if the transaction is a
gift."); but see Estate of Levine v. Comm'r, 634 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that a gift of




free to the donee. The § 1015 basis rules explicitly permit the shifting of
the pre-transfer accrued gain by providing, for purposes of calculating
gain (but not loss),' 7 that the adjusted basis of the donee is equal to the
adjusted basis of the donor immediately before the gift. 18 It is not un-
common to structure a gift transfer of appreciated property from a high-
bracket transferor to a lower-bracket transferee with an express purpose
of reducing the income tax cost of the disposition of the property. An
income tax system invites such transactions if (1) the taxpaying unit is the
individual, (2) rates are progressive, (3) realization, rather than accrual, is
the taxable event (and a gift is not a realization event), (4) gifts are ex-
cluded from the income tax base of the donee, and (5) basis carries over
from the donor to the donee.
A subsequent sale by the donee of the gift property generally would
cause any resulting gain to be taxed to the donee. A subsequent sale by
the donee might be attributed to the donor, however, if the sale was fully
negotiated or otherwise pre-arranged by the donor. 19 If the sale occurred
soon after the gift, special scrutiny of the transaction might be expected, 20
but a well-advised donor could structure a gift transaction with relatively
little risk that the gain realized by the donee would be attributed to the
donor for income tax purposes.
2. The Alleged Income-Shifting Techniques
The major thesis put forward in the articles is that the absence of a gift
tax makes income-shifting strategies much more viable. 2' The articles as-
sert that a transfer-tax-free environment would permit (1) a gift-tax-free
transfer of appreciated property from a high-tax-bracket donor to a
trusted related party or friend, (2) sale of the property and recognition of
the gain in the property by the transferee at a net income tax cost less
than if the transferor had recognized the gain, and (3) a gift-tax-free
transfer back to the transferor of the net (after-tax) proceeds of sale.2 2 In
other words, the technique involves a transfer followed by a retransfer
back to the original transferor. If any one of the suggested techniques
17. The shifting of losses is restricted by § 1015. Even though § 1015 permits whole-
sale shifting of pre-transfer gain, different rules apply with respect to the shifting of pre-
transfer loss. A special basis rule applies to the donee in the case of property the fair
market value of which on the date of the gift is less than the transferor's adjusted basis
immediately prior to the gift. If this loss basis rule applies, then for purposes of determin-
ing loss (not gain), the donee's adjusted basis is the fair market value as of the time of the
gift. In sum, these non-mutual § 1015 rules permit pre-transfer gains to be shifted by a gift,
but pre-transfer losses are subject to limitation. I.R.C. § 1015 (2002).
18. See also I.R.C. § 1015(d)(6) (2002) (providing income tax basis adjustment for por-
tion of gift tax paid attributable to appreciation in the property).
19. See generally Court Holding Co. v. Comm'r, 324 U.S. 331 (1945); United States v.
Cumberland Pub. Serv. Co., 338 U.S. 451 (1950); Palmer v. Comm'r, 62 T.C. 684 (1974).
20. See Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 335-36 (1940); Estate of Stranahan v.
Comm'r, 472 F.2d 867, 869 (6th Cir. 1973).
21. See Blattmachr & Gans, supra note 12, at 574-75; Lee A. Sheppard, Debt in Con-
templation of Death, 91 TAX NOTES 1655 (2001); Buckley, Transfer Tax Repeal Proposals,
supra note 7, at 539.
22. See Blattmachr & Gans, supra note 12, at 396.
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succeeds in shifting the income tax incidence from the transferor, signifi-
cant federal income tax revenues may be lost due to the reduction in the
effective tax rate applicable to the pre-transfer appreciation. 23
It might seem that, in a high-wealth family likely to be able to engage
in such income-shifting transfers, all parties would be in a relatively high
tax bracket. In many cases, all parties would be in a high tax bracket, but
that will not be true in all cases. Examples of such high-wealth but low-
bracket taxpayers include (1) investors with high-growth, but low-yield
investments, (2) owners of real estate improvements and other deprecia-
ble property, the deductions with respect to which are significant and pro-
tect other income from tax, and (3) persons with § 1212 capital loss
carryovers. 24
The absence of a gift tax also may make the transfer-retransfer scenario
more likely with trusts.25 Under the generally applicable statutory rules,
a trust is a taxpayer for federal income tax purposes, and it must pay tax
at the § 1(e) rates on its taxable income. 26 To the extent that a trust is a
grantor trust pursuant to §§ 671-78, however, the trust is ignored, and the
income, deductions, credits, etc., of the trust are reported by the person
deemed to be the owner of the trust. If income shifting is desired, the
settlor of the trust would not want the transferee trust to be a grantor
trust pursuant to §§ 673-77 because any gain recognized by the trust
would be attributed to the settlor pursuant to § 671.
Under the grantor trust provisions, the "adverse party" rules27 may
23. The absence of a federal gift tax also might facilitate the shifting of gain for state
income tax purposes. The fact that some states have no income tax (or do not impose an
income tax on trusts) might have significant revenue implications for states that do impose
an income tax on their residents. A no-gift-tax environment would encourage taxpayers,
residing in a state with an income tax, to move property to a trust with a situs in a state
with no income tax on trusts. The trust would have to pay income tax to the federal gov-
ernment, but not to any state (because the situs state has no income tax). Only when the
trust makes a distribution to a beneficiary would any state income tax be imposed. The
distribution would be subject to state income tax in the hands of the distributee only to the
extent of the year of distribution income of the trust, unless the state taxing the beneficiary
had a throwback and/or grantor trust rules). See generally I.R.C. §§ 665-68 (throwback
rules), 671-78 (grantor trust rules) (2002). The state tax regime also would tend to en-
courage the conversion of personal service income, taxed by the state of residence of the
service provider, into passive income of others (one or more trusts or individuals) in a state
that does not tax such income. See Blattmachr & Gans, supra note 12, at 398.
24. Lending some credence to the possibilities of income shifting is the fact that it has
been reported that 70% of individual tax returns are taxed at or below the lowest then
applicable tax bracket of 15%. See Buckley, Transfer Tax Repeal Proposals, supra note 7,
at 539-40. Present law provides a 10% tax bracket. See I.R.C. § 1 (2002).
25. See generally Buckley, Transfer Tax Repeal Proposals, supra note 7, at 539-40;
Blattmachr & Gans, supra note 12, at 396-97; Sheppard, supra note 21, at 1658-59.
26. See I.R.C. §§ 641-46 (2002).
27. An adverse party is defined by § 672(a) as follows:
For purposes of this subpart, the term "adverse party" means any person
having a substantial beneficial interest in the trust which would be adversely
affected by the exercise or nonexercise of the power which he possesses re-
specting the trust. A person having a general power of appointment over the
trust property shall be deemed to have a beneficial interest in the trust.
I.R.C. § 672(a) (2002).
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prevent a trust from being a grantor trust. For example, § 676 provides
generally that the settlor of a trust is deemed to be the owner of the trust
if, at any time, the power to revest in the settlor title to trust property is
exercisable by the settlor or a non-adverse party, or both.28 Thus, if only
an adverse party has such a power, the trust is not a grantor trust.29 The
income-shifting articles maintain that the adverse party rules will have
less substance if consent of the adverse party to a transfer to the settlor
does not invoke a gift tax on the adverse party. 30
At first glance, the income-shifting possibilities described in the articles
strike me as plausible; sequential related-party transfers probably would
be more widely contemplated in a no-gift-tax world. The income-shifting
articles mention various non-statutory doctrines that might be used to
combat the transfer-retransfer technique. Doctrines that might apply in-
clude (1) agency, (2) some type of informal trust, (3) sham, (4) step trans-
action, (5) substance over form, (6) business purpose, and (7) lack of
economic substance. 31 The income-shifting articles assert, without discus-
28. See I.R.C. § 676 (2002).
29. The special treatment of an adverse party may be supported by the notion that the
adverse party will not defer to the wishes of the settlor because of the adverse effect of any
such consent on the economic interest of the adverse party in the trust.
30. See Richard Oshins & Jerry Kasner, The Dynastic Trust Under the Relief Act of
2001, 93 TAX NOTES 247, 248-50 (2001); Blattmachr & Gans, supra note 12, at 396-97.
31. See generally BORIS I. BITIKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF
INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS, 1 4.3 (2002) (Pervasive Judicial Doctrines). For use of
agency or constructive trust principles, see Ronald D. Aucutt, Gift Tax Repeal Bill Mini-
mizes Income Tax Problems, 91 TAX NOTES 1015, 1015-16 (2001). See generally RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, § 12 cmts. a-c (2002) (explaining that acts of agent on behalf
of principal are considered the acts of the principal); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITU-
TION, § 160 cmts. a-i (2002) (explaining that constructive trusts are imposed when
equitable).
For the sham transactions doctrine, see United Parcel Serv. v. Comm'r, 254 F.3d 1014,
1018 (11th Cir. 2001) (explaining the sham transaction doctrine broadly, that "[e]ven if the
transaction has economic effects, it must be disregarded if it has no business purpose and
its motive is tax avoidance"); Falsetti v. Comm'r, 85 T.C. 332, 347 (1985) (explaining the
sham transactions doctrine, referred to as "sham in substance," is the attempt "to charac-
terize transactions contrary to objective economic realities and which have no economic
significance beyond expected tax benefits"); BITIKER & LOKKEN, supra note 31, 4.3.4A.
For the step transaction doctrine, see Minn. Tea Co. v. Helvering, 302 U.S. 609, 613-14
(1938) (articulating the step transaction doctrine, that the "given result at the end of a
straight path is not made a different result because reached by following a devious path" as
when a complex transaction involves a party as a "mere conduit" to achieve a tax advan-
tage); King Entertainers, Inc. v. Comm'r, 418 F.2d 511, 516 (Fed. Cl. 1969) (holding that
the step transaction doctrine does not require that the parties are committed to a series of
transactions, if such a series is contemplated); BiTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 31, 4.3.5;
see also, Tandy Corp. v. Comm'r, 92 T.C. 1165, 1173 (1989) (explaining that the step trans-
action doctrine does not apply if the timing of individual steps "has economic substance
and is motivated by valid business purposes").
For the doctrine of substance over form, see Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 467-68
(1935); Grodt & McKay Realty v. Comm'r, 77 T.C. 1221, 1236 (1981) (stating that "[i]t is
well settled that the economic substance of transactions, rather than their form, governs for
tax purposes"); BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 31, 4.3.3.
For the business purpose doctrine, see Comm'r v. Transp. Trading & Terminal Corp., 176
F.2d 570, 572 (2d Cir. 1949) (holding that the business purpose doctrine "means that in
construing words of a tax statute which describe commercial or industrial transactions we
are to understand them to refer to transactions entered upon for commercial or industrial
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sion or analysis, that these doctrines will not be adequate to deal with the
income-shifting challenge. 32
a. The Parade of Horribles
The following candidates have been offered as a potential lower-tax-
rate transferee to accomplish the intended income shifting and return of
the net (after tax) proceeds to the donor:33
1. Trusted relative or friend who is subject to U.S. tax.
2. Trusted relative or friend who is overseas and not subject to U.S.
tax.
3. A domestic 34 trust that is not a grantor trust.35
4. A foreign trust of which no U.S. person is a § 679 beneficiary.
Because of the reach of § 684, however, appreciated property cannot
be transferred to such a foreign trust without adverse tax conse-
quences.3 6 The transferred amount thereafter could grow free of
U.S. tax, and the beneficiary eventually could return the accumu-
lated amount to the donor.37
5. A § 678 trust 38 for a trusted lower-bracket demand right
powerholder; the income and gains of the trust would be taxed to the
powerholder rather than the trust. The desired § 678 status could be
accomplished through a demand right in favor of the trusted low-tax-
bracket powerholder, even though the demand right might expire in
purposes and not to include transactions entered upon for no other motive but to escape
taxation"); Robert T. Smith, Business Purpose: The Assault Upon the Citadel, 53 TAX LAW.
1 (1999) (defending the business purpose and economic substance doctrines as proper and
necessary exercise of judicial power); BI--KER & LOKKEN, supra note 31, J 4.3.4.
For the lack of economic substance doctrine, see Rose v. Comm'r, 868 F.2d 851, 854
(holding that the "essential inquiry is whether the transaction had any practicable eco-
nomic effect other than the creation of economic tax losses"). The lack of economic sub-
stance is closely related to the sham transaction doctrine. See BIT'KER & LOKKEN, supra
note 31, 4.3.4A. It is also closely related to the business purpose doctrine. See Smith,
supra.
If the transferee has agreed to retransfer the net proceeds of sale to the transferor, the
transaction may be deemed fraudulent.
32. See Buckley, Transfer Tax Repeal Proposals, supra note 7, at 540; Blattmachr &
Gans, supra note 12, at 396-97.
33. See Blattmachr & Gans, supra note 12; Buckley, Transfer Tax Repeal Proposals,
supra note 7; Johnston, supra note 12, at Al; Sheppard, supra note 21, at 1656; Martin A.
Sullivan, JCT Estimates Widespread Evasion with Estate Tax Repeal, 91 TAX NOTES 10, 12
(2001).
34. Section 684 applies to certain transfers to foreign persons, including foreign trusts,
to cause recognition of gain to the transferor at the time of the transfer. Section 684 is
discussed more fully below.
35. The viability of the trust for income shifting is compromised by the compressed tax
brackets that apply to trusts under § 1(e).
36. Section 684 provided (in 2001 during the deliberations over transfer tax repeal)
that (1) any transfer of property by a U.S. person to a foreign trust is treated as a sale or
exchange for an amount equal to the fair market value of the property transferred and (2)
the transferor must recognize as gain the excess of (a) the fair market value of the trans-
ferred property over (b) the adjusted basis (for purposes of determining gain) of the prop-
erty in the hands of the transferor. Accordingly, cash or non-appreciated property in kind
would be suitable for transfer. As a result, no pre-transfer appreciation would be shifted.
37. See also Buckley, Transfer Tax Repeal Proposals, supra note 7, at 540-41.
38. See 2 U.S.C. § 639(a)(1)(B) (2002).
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the future (to terminate access of the powerholder to the trust prop-
erty). The trust would be a § 678 trust for so long as the demand
right existed. In addition, the trust instrument could be drafted to
provide, at some future date, that the trustee (or others) could add a
beneficiary including the settlor. The retransfer to the transferor of
the net (after-tax) sales proceeds could be made by the trust (if the
demand right is never exercised and the transferor is added as a ben-
eficiary) or by the powerholder (if the demand right is exercised).
b. Effect on the Legislative Process
The allegations that greater income shifting would occur in a transfer-
tax-free setting had a significant impact on the participants in the reform
process; the effect was to cause heartburn to some and elation to others.
Three groups were effected: (1) the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxa-
tion, (2) the proponents of repeal of the transfer tax system, and (3) the
opponents of repeal.
As Congress undertook consideration of transfer tax repeal in early
2001, the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation provided a revenue
estimate of the cost of repeal. During the relevant 10-year period re-
quired by congressional budget rules,39 the staff of the Joint Committee
estimated the revenue yield from (and the cost of repeal of) the transfer
tax system at $410 billion.40 After the income-shifting articles were pub-
lished (and after consultation with practitioners), the Joint Committee
staff reconsidered its revenue loss estimate to factor in possible "income
tax avoidance schemes."'41 The revised revenue loss estimate, factoring in
possible income tax reductions, for the relevant 10-year period was signif-
icantly increased from $410 billion to $662 billion, and this did not please
the proponents of repeal of the transfer tax system. 42 Needless to say, the
revised revenue estimates provided considerable additional fodder for
the opponents of repeal.
39. See 2 U.S.C. § 601(f) (2002) (requiring the use of Joint Committee on Taxation
revenue estimates by the Congressional Budget Office); Congressional Budget Act of
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, § 403, 88 Stat. 297, 352 (H.R. 7130).
40. See generally Sullivan, supra note 33, at 10.
41. See Paull's Feb. Memo to W&M Counsel on Estate and Gift Tax Estimates, 2001
TAX NOTES ToAY 60-44 (2001).
42. Stephen J. Entin, Why the Death Tax Lives, WALL Sr. J., June 19, 2002, at A18:
In this case, JCT increased the cost of repealing the estate tax by coming
up with an implausible scenario under which, after repeal, everyone would
dodge their capital gains taxes. How? By parking their assets, free of gift
tax, with an elderly relative who was likely to die soon, and who would then
return the assets as a bequest with the advantage of a lower capital gains tax
rate. (Under the current law, an heir's cost basis for capital gains purposes is
the price of the asset when the benefactor died; any unrealized gains accrued
before death are erased.)
What nonsense. Such revolving door transfers could have been blocked by
regulations. Besides, such ploys are risky; If you give your assets to your
Aunt Fanny, she may not die on schedule, or she may will the assets to your
no-good cousin Fred. In short, the JCT assumed highly unlikely behavior
changes that raised the apparent cost of the provision, and ignored far more
certain changes in behavior that would have reduced its cost.
[Vol. 56
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III. CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
A. REPEAL OF THE "DEATH TAX"
The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 200143
("EGTRRA") made profound changes to the structure of the U.S. tax
system. By way of brief review of its most significant aspects, EGTRRA,
when fully implemented in 2010, 44 (1) repeals the estate tax, (2) repeals
the generation-skipping transfer tax, and (3) repeals § 1014 step-up in ad-
justed basis and replaces it with a carryover basis at death regime in
§ 1022.45
Relatively large amounts are excluded from § 1022 carryover basis and
receive a step-up to fair market value: (1) each estate can select up to
$1,300,000 of property to receive a step-up 46 and (2) an additional
$3,000,000 of step-up is available with respect to property transferred to a
surviving spouse.47 Congress anticipated that these two limited (but still
generous) step-up amounts might be exploited by near-to-death transfers,
and built anti-abuse rules into the statute.48 Section 1022(d)(1)(C) pro-
vides that § 1022(b) (the $1,300,000 step-up) and § 1022(c) (the
$3,000,000 step-up with respect to qualifying transfers to a surviving
spouse) do not apply to property acquired by the decedent by gift or by
inter vivos transfer for less than adequate and full consideration during
the 3-year period ending on the date of the decedent's death. Property
acquired from the decedent's spouse generally qualifies for the § 1022
step-up unless, during the 3-year period, the spouse acquired the property
in whole or in part by gift or by inter vivos transfer for less than adequate
and full consideration. It is noteworthy that Congress was willing to im-
pose a three-year look back period in determining the income tax conse-
quences to the successor in interest of the decedent.
43. The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-
16 § 501, 115 Stat. 38, 69 (2001).
44. Because of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, EGTRRA has a sunset provi-
sion that causes the entire legislation to expire (absent intervening legislation) on Decem-
ber 31, 2010. See discussion supra note 2.
45. See generally Joseph M. Dodge, What's Wrong With Carryover Basis Under H.R. 8,
91 TAX NOTES 961 (2001).
46. See I.R.C. § 1022(b) (2002).
47. See I.R.C. § 1022(c) (2002).
48. See I.R.C. § 1022(d)(1)(C) (2002), which provides as follows:
PROPERTY ACQUIRED BY DECEDENT BY GIFT WITHIN 3 YEARS
OF DEATH. -
(i) IN GENERAL.-
Subsections (b) and (c) shall not apply to property acquired by the decedent
by gift or by inter vivos transfer for less than adequate and full consideration
in money or money's worth during the 3-year period ending on the date of
the decedent's death.
(ii) EXCEPTION FOR CERTAIN GIFTS FROM SPOUSE.-
Clause (i) shall not apply to property acquired by the decedent from the
decedent's spouse unless, during such 3-year period, such spouse acquired
the property in whole or in part by gift or by inter vivos transfer for less than
adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth.
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B. TRANSFERS IN TRUST
Another example of the congressional unease regarding tax planning
opportunities in a no-estate-tax environment is reflected by the addition
in EGTRRA of § 2511(c), which applies with respect to transfers in trust
made after December 29, 2009.49 Section 2511(c) provides that, except as
provided in regulations, a transfer in trust is treated as a transfer of prop-
erty by gift, unless the trust is a grantor trust treated as wholly owned by
the donor or the donor's spouse. The purpose and scope of this provision
are far from clear. 50 Perhaps this provision reflects the sentiment that the
gift tax should not apply if the transfer in trust does not accomplish an
income shift, and no income shift occurs if the trust is a grantor trust. It is
not clear from the language of the provision whether § 2511(c) will make
any transfer in trust that otherwise would be incomplete, but is not to a
trust that is such a grantor trust, a completed gift. Likewise, if the trans-
fer is to a trust that is a grantor trust (e.g., due to the settlor retaining a
§ 675 administrative power) but otherwise would be a completed gift, it is
not clear whether (and to what extent) the transfer is a completed gift
(and, to the extent it is not a completed gift, is there a gift at the moment
of death?).
C. FOREIGN TRANSFER PROVISIONS
Section 684 was added to the Internal Revenue Code in 1997 to pro-
vide that a transfer of property to a foreign estate or trust is treated as a
sale or exchange by the transferor for an amount equal to the fair market
value of the transferred property. 51 Section 684 was amended by EGT-
RRA by inclusion within § 684 of any transfer (other than any "lifetime
transfer") 52 to a nonresident alien individual. Accordingly, after the 2001
amendment (which is effective after December 31, 2009), § 684 treats as a
realizing event to the transferor any transfer of property to (1) a foreign
estate, (2) a foreign trust, or (3) a nonresident alien.53 Section 684
prescribes recognition of any realized gain; it is silent with respect to any
loss to such a transferee, but Regulations § 1.684-1(a)(2) prescribes that
no loss is allowed. 54 Section 267 would compel such a result if the trans-
feree were a § 267(b) related party.55
D. GIFT TAX IS RETAINED
Even though Congress decided in EGTRRA to repeal the estate tax
and the generation-skipping transfer tax, it decided to retain the gift tax.
49. The provision was added by EGTRRA, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 511(e), 115 Stat. 38,
71, and amended by the Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-
147, § 411(g)(1). The provision applies to gifts made after December 31, 2009.
50. See generally Oshins & Kasner, supra note 30.
51. See I.R.C. § 684 (2002).
52. See I.R.C. § 684(b)(1) (2002).
53. See I.R.C. § 684 (2002).
54. See I.R.C. § 684 (2002).
55. See I.R.C. § 267(b) (2002).
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In other words, the 2001 law effected only partial repeal of the transfer
tax system. Interestingly, the Conference Committee Report is silent as
to why the gift tax is retained, but (1) retention of the gift tax reduced the
revenue loss associated with the legislation 56 and (2) the gift tax appar-
ently was considered to be a device by which to discourage income-shift-
ing abuses. The Joint Committee staff reportedly was prepared to offer
some techniques within the income tax, rather than the gift tax, for deal-
ing with income-shifting abuses, but the members were disinclined to deal
with such new income tax anti-abuse provisions due, in part, to time pres-
sure to complete work on the legislation by Memorial Day, as desired by
the President.57 Instead, the gift tax was retained.
During the phase-in of EGTRRA, the gift tax unified credit exemption
equivalent amount rises to $1,000,000.58 Lifetime gifts in excess of the
exemption equivalent amount (other than qualifying transfers between
spouses, which will continue to be tax-free without limitation under
§ 2523) are discouraged because they would be subject to gift tax if made
during life, even though any post-death transfer would not be subject to
tax because of the absence of an estate tax.
Significantly, the gift tax rate ends up eventually (at the end of the
EGTRRA phase-in period) at 35%, which is equal to the highest § 1 in-
come tax rate.59 Thus, the gift tax moves closer to being a surrogate for
the income tax.60 The gift-tax-as-surrogate-for-income-tax rationale is
not fully accomplished, however, because (1) the gift tax applies to the
entire value of the gift property, not just the gain element,61 and (2) the
gift transfer does not generate a basis step-up to fair market value,62
which would result if the property were sold and the income tax applied
to the gain. Indeed, imposing a gift tax on an income-shifting transfer is a
very crude and imprecise substitute for collection of the appropriate in-
come tax on the shifted income.
Although I do not favor repeal of the transfer tax system, it strikes me
as logically inconsistent to retain a gift tax while having no estate or gen-
eration-skipping transfer tax. It is painfully obvious that the existence of
a gift tax, but not an estate tax, creates no end of incentives for structur-
ing imaginative lifetime transfers, which provide immediate economic
benefit to the donee, to be deemed incomplete for gift tax purposes so
that (1) the lifetime gift tax does not apply and (2) the transfer is com-
56. See supra discussion of the Joint Committee revenue estimates in the text accom-
panying note 39.
57. See Terry L. Simmons, Giving in All Seasons: The Case for Philanthropy in Troub-
led Times, Speech at the Kalamazoo Community Foundation (October 9, 2002) (speech
outline on file with author).
58. See I.R.C. § 2505 (2002).
59. See I.R.C. §§ 2502(a), 1(i)(2) (2002).
60. See generally Gerzog, supra note 7, at 983.
61. See I.R.C. §§ 2501, 2503 (2002).
62. See I.R.C. § 1015(d)(6) (2002) (basis increase according to gift tax paid on appreci-
ation in gift property).
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plete at death and, thus, not subject to any tax.63 Accordingly, I am will-
ing to consider income-shifting anti-abuse mechanisms (other than the
non-statutory doctrines described above) 64 within the income tax, rather
than the gift tax. If adequate income-tax-based mechanisms were availa-
ble, I would favor repeal of the gift tax as logically congruent with repeal
of the estate tax and the generation-skipping transfer tax.
IV. POST-EGTRRA VIABILITY OF INCOME-
SHIFTING TECHNIQUES
I discuss below which, if any, of the above-described income-shifting
techniques are viable after enactment of the 2001 legislation. Thereafter
in Part V, I discuss whether various anti-abuse provisions within the in-
come tax would be adequate to deal with the income-shifting problems.
A. TECHNICAL VIABILITY OF VARIOUS TRANSFEREES
AFTER EGTRRA
I turn now to a post-EGTRRA evaluation of the income-shifting via-
bility of the transfer-retransfer technique using various transferees identi-
fied in the income-shifting articles. With respect to each of the following
transferees, I assume (without conceding on the merits) that the non-stat-
utory doctrines are inapplicable. 65
Transfer to trusted relative or friend subject to U.S. tax with eventual
retransfer to transferor. A transfer of appreciated property to a trusted
relative or friend (who is a U.S. person) 66 with eventual return of the
after-tax proceeds of disposition to donor is subject to no specific statu-
tory provisions and may be viable for income shifting.
Transfer to trusted relative or friend who is overseas and not subject to
U.S. tax with eventual retransfer to transferor. A transfer of appreciated
property to a trusted foreign relative or friend with eventual return of the
after-tax proceeds of disposition to donor will not be successful after
EGTRRA to shift the pre-transfer appreciation. The EGTRRA revi-
sions to § 684 preclude the shift. Section 684 would treat any such trans-
fer to a nonresident alien as a realizing event to the transferor, with the
63. Professor Dodge has argued in favor of a "hard-to-complete rule" with respect to
ambiguous lifetime transfers. Such a rule would tend to capture post inter-vivos transfer
appreciation in the estate tax base and would address other value-shifting strategies to
minimize transfer tax. See generally Joseph M. Dodge, Redoing the Estate and Gift Taxes
Along Easy-to-Value Lines, 43 TAX L. REV. 241, 269-72 (1988); Dodge, supra note 1, text
accompanying notes 133-37. In a no-estate-tax environment, perhaps the rule should be
reversed and converted to an "easy-to-complete rule." See Gerzog, supra note 7. The
answer may depend in part on whether an incomplete inter vivos gift made complete at
death would be subject to the gift tax (if there is no estate tax). Gerzog asserts that a gift
complete at death is unlikely to be a taxable gift (given estate tax repeal), so she argues for
an easy-to-complete rule with respect to lifetime gifts. See Gerzog, supra note 7.
64. See supra text accompanying note 30.
65. Id.
66. This discussion is limited to transfers other than to a nonresident alien. A transfer
to a nonresident alien would be subject to revised § 684; see supra Part IlI.C.
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result that the pre-transfer appreciation in the transferred property would
be taxed to the transferor. 67
Transfer to a domestic trust that is not a grantor trust. If the instrument
creating a domestic68 trust gives an adverse party69 the sole right to ap-
prove distributions to the settlor of the trust, the trust is not a grantor
trust with respect to the settlor.70 Accordingly, any gain recognized by
the trust would not be taxed to the settlor (or taxed at the settlor's rate);
instead, the gain would be taxed at the generally unfavorable tax rates71
applicable to the trust (or to the trust beneficiary if the property is distrib-
uted to the beneficiary in a transaction in which gain is not recognized by
the trust and the beneficiary receives a carryover basis from the trust). 72
Although use of a nongrantor domestic trust may succeed in shifting in-
come, its viability to save income tax is ambiguous, at best. The trust is
likely to be taxed at high rates (admittedly, the beneficiary may be taxed
at lower rates), but under certain circumstances, this transferee might
generate less tax, at least with respect to relatively modest amounts of
income and gain.
Transfer to foreign trust of which no U.S. person is a § 679 beneficiary.
The transfer of cash or other non-appreciated property to a foreign trust
of which no U.S. person is a § 679 beneficiary has been suggested. Be-
cause the transfer involves cash or other non-appreciated property, it is
designed to avoid § 684.7 3 The transferred amounts could grow at a re-
duced (or zero) income tax rate, and whatever remains could be returned
eventually to the transferor. This technique might well accomplish an
overall income tax reduction, but this technique has long been available
under U.S. tax law. This technique arguably involves no income tax
abuse because it involves no income shifting as to built-in gain.74 Instead,
67. Outbound transfers long have been an enforcement problem under the Internal
Revenue Code. The expanded scope of § 684 no doubt likewise will present compliance
problems, but the change in the statute gives me no reason to think that noncompliance
would be any worse. See Ronald D. Aucutt, Gift Tax Repeal Bill Minimizes Income Tax
Problems, 91 TAX NOTES 1015 (2001).
68. Section 684 applies to certain transfers to foreign persons, including foreign trusts,
to cause recognition of gain to the transferor at the time of the transfer. See discussion of
§ 684 supra Part III.C.
69. See supra text accompanying note 28 (discussing adverse party concept).
70. Accordingly, the transfer to the trust would be a completed gift, subject to gift tax
under § 2511(c) (as added in 2001 to be effective after 2009).
71. The § 1 tax rates applicable to trusts progress very rapidly through the lower tax
rate brackets because the dollar amounts of taxable income subject to the lower tax rate
brackets are lesser amounts as compared to the other filing status amounts. This is re-
ferred to as "tax bracket compression." To the extent that the taxation of net capital gain
is depends upon the tax bracket otherwise applicable to the taxpayer, the taxation of net
capital gain of a trust may be less favorable than the taxation of other taxpayers with
identical amounts of income.
72. See I.R.C. § 643(e) (2002).
73. See discussion of § 684, supra Part III.C.
74. A proper determination of the value of the property in-kind being transferred is
necessary to the proper tax treatment of such a transfer. Section 684 will apply to transfers




only the post-transfer gain and/or income could be shifted and, to the
extent that ownership of the underlying property is fully transferred to
the transferee, it is appropriate to tax the post-transfer gain and/or in-
come to the transferee.
Transfer to a § 678 trust for a trusted low-bracket powerholder. Most of
the grantor trust provisions (i.e., §§ 673-77, 679) deem the settlor of the
trust to be the owner of the trust. Section 678 deems a person other than
the settlor as the owner of a trust with respect to which the person has
sole power to vest the corpus or the income therefrom in the person. 7
5
Such a § 678 trust could be created by giving a demand right over the
trust property to a powerholder. If the transferred property were to be
demanded by the powerholder and then sold, the tax on the gain would
be calculated by reference to the circumstances of the powerholder, not
the transferor. If the transferred property were to be sold by the § 678
trust, the tax on the gain would be calculated by reference to the circum-
stances of the powerholder pursuant to the grantor trust rules. 76 Accord-
ingly, a net reduction in tax cost might be achieved with a § 678 trust and/
or the powerholder.
Of the five above-listed transferees, the first, a trusted U.S. relative or
friend, appears viable for income shifting. The second transferee, a
trusted foreign relative or friend, will not be effective after the 2001
EGTRRA revisions to § 684. The third transferee is a domestic trust that
is not a grantor trust, and realizing an income tax savings by use of the
trust is not likely to result in significant tax savings, given the § 1(e) tax
rate structure. The fourth transferee is a foreign trust of which no U.S.
person is a § 679 beneficiary, and this technique involves no income-shift-
ing abuse because there can be no shift of built-in gain. The fifth trans-
feree, a § 678 trust for a trusted low-bracket powerholder, may be viable
for income shifting. To summarize, I conclude that the viable income-
shifting techniques constitute a threat of unknown magnitude to the in-
come tax (assuming the non-statutory doctrines are inapplicable). 77
B. ASSESSMENT OF INCOME SHIFTING AFTER EGTRRA
1. The Rhetoric
Some of the rhetoric used in the debate about transfer tax reform was
very impassioned and at a high decibel level. Transfer taxation raises fun-
damental questions about the structure of society and the distributions of
wealth and power, so the strong rhetoric may be expected. For example,
some of the voices heard in the income-shifting articles were partisans in
75. Section 678 also applies if (1) a person has previously partially released or other-
wise modified a power to vest the corpus or the income therefrom in himself and (2) after
the release or modification retains such control as would, within §§ 671 to 677, subject a
grantor of a trust to treatment as the owner. See I.R.C. § 678(a)(2) (2002). In addition,
§ 678(a) does not apply with respect to a power over income if the grantor of the trust or a
§ 679 transferor is otherwise treated as the owner under the other grantor trust provisions.
76. See I.R.C. §§ 678, 671 (2002).
77. See supra text accompanying note 30 (non-statutory doctrines).
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the legislative process,78 and some of the discussion of the demise of the
income tax (due to income shifting) may have been strategic and
exaggerated.
2. Is the Transfer-Retransfer Technique Viable?
The proffered techniques assert that income shifting can be accom-
plished by the transfer of appreciated property to a trusted relative or
friend with eventual return to the transferor of the after-tax proceeds of
disposition. EGTRRA considered, but did not enact, provisions to deal
directly with this technique.79
The transfer-retransfer scenario presents troubling issues. To the ex-
tent that the two transfers are independent, each transfer should be
honored (with the result that any gain from disposition of the transferred
property by the transferee would be taxed to the transferee). To the ex-
tent that the initial transfer is effective and without restriction, the trans-
feree is the owner of the property and has interests that are adverse to
the interests of the transferor. If the initial transfer and the retransfer are
interrelated or the rights of the transferee are incomplete, however, the
transaction may not be worthy of respect to the extent that any built-in
gain should be taxed to the transferor. Deciding whether the transfers
are related and complete would involve an exceedingly difficult factual
determination, which would challenge both counsel for taxpayers in plan-
ning transactions and the IRS in administering the tax laws.
The income-shifting articles describe the use of a "trusted" trans-
feree. 80 The implication is that this trusted transferee will not be obli-
gated to retransfer any amount to the transferor, but the trusted
transferee somehow can be relied upon to return the after-tax proceeds
of sale of the property to the transferor at an appropriate time (perhaps
at the request of the transferor when the transferor has sufficient "need"
for the retransfer). It strikes me as a very fine line, indeed, between be-
ing "trusted" and being obliged to retransfer the property (or having an
understanding to that effect). The transferor in the transfer-retransfer
transaction is seeking income shifting only for income tax purposes. It
strikes me as unlikely that such an aggressive taxpayer/transferor would
be willing to make outright transfers of unfettered ownership without
some significant assurance of getting back, in some form, the net (after-
tax) proceeds of sale if the transferor is in need. It also seems likely to
me that such a transferor seeking income shifting only for tax purposes is
not likely to comply fully with any tax regime applicable to such transfers,
whether the tax regime be in the form of the income tax (seeking to attri-
78. See Buckley, Transfer Tax Repeal Proposals, supra note 7 (Buckley at the time was
chief Democratic Tax Counsel for the House Ways and Means Committee).
79. H.R. 8, 107th Cong. (2001) contained a revision to § 7701, which would have pro-
vided additional authority to the IRS to disregard purported gift transfers if appropriate to
prevent avoidance of the income tax. See discussion infra Part V.C.1 (proposed, but not
enacted revision to § 7701).
80. See Blattmachr & Gans, supra note 12, at 396.
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bute the gain to the transferor) or a gift tax (imposing a transfer tax).
Accordingly, collection and enforcement problems are likely to be pre-
sent under either an income tax or a gift tax.8'
I do not address whether present law non-statutory doctrines (agency,
some type of informal trust, sham, step transaction, substance over form,
business purpose, and lack of economic substance) 2 cannot adequately
police the income-shifting techniques that EGTRRA invites. It is far
from clear to me that these doctrines will be inadequate to deal with the
transfer-retransfer technique, but I do not undertake such an analysis in
this brief comment. I do feel compelled to observe, however, that two
close-in-time transfers between related persons beg for special scrutiny
and might call for imposition of some of the non-statutory doctrines de-
scribed above that, if applicable, would recharacterize the events so as to
treat the transferor as having sold the property. Application of the non-
statutory doctrines depends upon the particular facts of each situation,
however, so I admit to some uncertainty as to the tax results. Accord-
ingly, for purposes of the following discussion, I am willing to admit that
this transfer-retransfer technique may be viable, and I next address in-
come tax statutory provisions that might prevent income-shifting abuses.
V. STATUTORY MECHANISMS WITHIN THE INCOME TAX
TO DEAL WITH INCOME SHIFTING
A. IDENTIFICATION OF THE INCOME-SHIFTING PROBLEM
Before considering what mechanisms might be effective with respect to
income-shifting abuses, it is necessary to identify the income-shifting
problem that needs attention. Three transactions might be considered as
producing an income shift for federal income tax purposes: (1) post trans-
fer income shifting (no built-in gain is shifted), (2) built-in gain income
shifting in which the transferee realizes and reports all gain (including the
built-in gain) and does not make a retransfer to the transferor, and (3)
81. Such a transferor seeking income shifting only for income tax purposes also would
raise professional responsibility problems for counsel involved in the transaction. To ad-
vise or implement such a transaction, counsel would need to be satisfied of the bona fide
non-fraudulent substance of the transaction. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CON-
DUnc R. 1.2(d). I question whether counsel could advise and structure a transaction that
would satisfy a transferor who wanted an income shift only for income tax purposes with
no other substantial loss of ownership rights. Counsel would be challenged to provide
substance to the original transfer while satisfying the expectations of the transferor-client.
Counsel would need to educate the client and change the client's purpose sufficiently to
give substance to the first transfer and uncertainty as to whether a retransfer would occur.
82. See supra text accompanying note 30 (non-statutory doctrines). See 2 U.S.C.
§ 642(a)(2). See also Congressional Budget Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, § 904(c)(2),
(e), 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. (88 Stat. 297) 326, 366, as amended by Joint Resolution Increasing
the Statutory Limit on Public Debt, Pub. L. No. 99-177, § 271(a), 99 Stat. 1037, 1094;
Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, Title XIII, § 13112(a)(11),
13208(a), 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-608, 1388-619; Line Item Veto Act, Pub. L. No. 104-130,
§ 4(c), 110 Stat. 1200, 1212; Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, Title X,
§ 10119, 111 Stat. 251, 695, reprinted in 2 U.S.C.A. 621 [hereinafter Congressional Budget
Act of 1974, § 904].
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built-in gain income shifting in which the transferee realizes and reports
all gain (including the built-in gain) and does make a retransfer to the
transferor.
The first-listed transaction involves no income-shifting abuse because
the periodic income and gain are taxed to the owner of the property dur-
ing the period such income and gain accrue. Accordingly, no income-
shifting remedy is needed for this transaction.
The second-listed transaction does involve a shift of accrued gain from
the transferor to the transferee, but U.S. tax law explicitly permits this
transaction. Inter vivos gain shifting has been permitted in the past 83 and
will continue after 2009 under §§ 1015 and 1022, so it seems that no rem-
edy is needed for this transaction.8 4
The third-listed transaction seems to generate the most visceral nega-
tive reaction, and this transfer (with built-in gain) - retransfer transaction
was the poster child for the income-shifting articles. Given the statutory
rules generally permitting income shifting, it seems that only this transfer-
retransfer transaction merits an anti-abuse rule. I consider below the in-
come tax anti-abuse mechanisms that would apply to the built-in gain
transfer-retransfer transaction.
B. POLITICAL SETTING
Before addressing statutory mechanisms that might deal with this po-
tential income-shifting problem, I want to suggest that the time is ripe to
address these income-shifting mechanisms because it is likely that Con-
gress soon will reconsider transfer taxes and related income tax matters.
Policy, budget, and technical reasons all suggest that Congress will have
to revisit these issues, perhaps in the near term.
On the political front, the proponents of permanent repeal were frus-
trated in 2001 by not being able (due to Budget Act provisions) 85 to make
repeal of the "death tax" permanent, and they very much want to make
the transfer tax system go away forever. The permanent repeal effort has
a majority of votes in its favor, 86 but the Budget Act supermajority re-
quirement of 60 votes in the Senate so far has precluded permanent re-
peal. The proponents will seek the earliest opportunity to make repeal
permanent.
83. See supra text accompanying notes 16-18. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 639(a), 642(a). See also
Congressional Budget Act of 1974, § 904, supra note 82.
84. Ultimately, I conclude below that an anti-abuse rule for the transfer-retransfer
transaction (the third-listed transaction above) would be unworkable. In the text following
note 94, infra, I argue for a rate-borrowing anti-abuse provision that would apply to this
second-listed transaction if the amount transferred exceeded specified exemption amounts.
85. See Johnston, supra note 12.
86. For the Senate majority, but not three-fifths supermajority vote, see 148 CONG.
REC. S5434 (daily ed. June 12, 2002) (Roll call Vote No. 151: 54 yeas, 44 nays, 2 not voting,
for a permanent repeal). For the House majority vote, see 148 CONG. REC. 1457-58 (daily
ed. June 4, 2001) (Roll call Vote No. 84: yeas 274, nays 154, not voting 3, for permanent
repeal) and 148 CONG. REC. H6403-04 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 2002) (Roll call Vote No. 401:
yeas 242, nays 158, not voting 32, for permanent repeal).
2003]
SMU LAW REVIEW
Another factor suggesting that Congress will soon consider the transfer
tax system is that permanent repeal becomes more expensive from a rev-
enue loss standpoint as time moves forward because of the ten-year reve-
nue loss period. In 2001, when Congress repealed the "death tax," the
repeal was gradually phased in and not fully effective until 2010, and 2010
was the last year in the prescribed ten-year revenue loss period. Accord-
ingly, much of the revenue loss associated with repeal of the "death tax"
was "backloaded" and outside of the ten-year time period (the years
within the ten-year period before 2010 reflected revenue losses from par-
tial, rather than complete, repeal). If the ten-year revenue loss period
remains the applicable period, it behooves the proponents of permanent
repeal to do it sooner rather than later. As the relevant ten-year period
moves forward in time, the revenue loss amount picks up more years of
complete repeal, as opposed to the revenue loss amounts in years 2002-
2009 that involve only partial repeal. In other words, the longer the pro-
ponents of permanent repeal wait, the more expensive permanent repeal
will become (using the ten-year period) because the last years in the ten-
year period involve total repeal rather than partial repeal. Another reve-
nue-based reason for immediate permanent repeal is that the revenue sit-
uation facing the federal government may not be sustainable, given the
large out-year revenue losses associated with EGTRRA, 87 to say nothing
of the disappearance of the once-large projected budget surpluses88 due
to the weakness of the economy. If the revenue situation worsens, it will
make permanent repeal more difficult to effect.
Another reason why Congress will have to address the transfer tax sys-
tem relates to § 1022 carryover basis. In my opinion, carryover basis is a
time bomb waiting to explode. 89 Compliance with it will be very difficult
and immensely unpopular with the public, and executors of estates will
face an uncomfortable situation in which they must consider, in making
distributions of property in kind, both value and adjusted basis of the
property. I expect that Congress eventually will do away with § 1022 (as
it did with the carryover basis provision enacted in the Tax Reform Act of
1976 and retroactively repealed). Congress need not act immediately,
however, as the effective date of § 1022 is 2010. It is clear to me that
87. See Sullivan, supra note 33.
88. Congressional Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years
2002-2011, available at http://www.cbo.gov, ch. 1 (Jan. 2001) (noting between January 2001
and January 2002 the budget surplus projections for the relevant ten-year periods de-
creased by $4 trillion and that in January 2002 the budget surplus projection for 2002-2011
was approximately $1.6 trillion); Congressional Budget Office, Current Budget Projections,
available at http://www.cbo.gov (Aug. 27, 2002) (reporting the budget surplus at approxi-
mately $1 trillion for 2003-2012); Martin Sullivan, supra note 33, at 1443 ("Even though the
fast-shrinking 10-year budget surplus still registers at about $1 trillion according to the
latest Congressional Budget Office projections, if the Social Security surplus is excluded
(as it should be), there is really a 10-year deficit of $1.5 trillion.").
89. See Lee Sheppard, 91 TAX NOTES 1655, 1656 (2001) (stating that carryover basis is
"a colossal mess.... Indeed, the carryover basis provisions are so awful that they cause one
to appreciate that the beauty of the estate tax is that it does not concern itself with the
basis of assets."). See also Dodge, supra note 45.
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carryover basis will become ever less appealing to Congress as the effec-
tive date of § 1022 approaches.
C. TECHNICAL SOLUTIONS
1. Dealing with Built-in Gain
As discussed above, the sole income-shifting abuse situation seeming to
merit an anti-abuse provision is the transfer-retransfer transaction, which
occurs if three conditions are satisfied: (1) the transferor transfers prop-
erty that has built-in gain, (2) the transferee of the property disposes of
the transferred property in a taxable transaction, and (3) the transferee
makes a transfer to the transferor (or anyone related to or designated by
the transferor). 90
As a preliminary matter, it should be noted that income shifting of
built-in gain is worthwhile only if the transfer causes the income or gain
to be taxed a lesser effective rate of tax than it would in the hands of the
transferor. Accordingly, an effective way of combating the federal in-
come tax revenue losses from income shifting is to negate any advantage
based on the tax rates. For example, a flat-rate income tax (a politically
unlikely outcome) would negate the income-shifting advantage. Simi-
larly, any mechanism that effectively taxes the built-in gain at the tax rate
applicable to the transferor, rather than the transferee, would negate the
tax advantage of shifting the gain, and I discuss below several rate-bor-
rowing mechanisms for taxing the built-in gain at the tax rate applicable
to the transferor.
I now evaluate various statutory anti-abuse mechanisms to determine
whether the mechanism would reach an administrable and appropriate
income tax result (and, thus, would permit repeal of the gift tax). Various
technical and policy choices are reflected in the following anti-abuse
mechanisms: (1) does it apply only to the transfer-retransfer transaction,
(2) does it require that all trigger events (e.g., the transfer, disposition,
and retransfer) occur with a prescribed time period, and (3) does it re-
quire built-in gain at the time of the first transfer?
a. Grant Authority to IRS to Recast Transaction
H.R. 8, a transfer tax repeal bill considered in 2001, contained a pro-
posed new § 7701(n), 91 which would have provided to the IRS an addi-
tional statutory anti-abuse rule. If applicable, the proposed § 7701(n)
90. Any statutory anti-abuse rule might (1) require the transfer and retransfer to occur
within a prescribed period of time and (2) exempt transactions that do not exceed an an-
nual or lifetime exemption amount.
91. The text of the provision is as follows:
(n) PURPORTED GIFTS MAY BE DISREGARDED- For purposes of
subtitle A, the Secretary may treat a transfer which purports to be a gift as
having never been transferred if, in connection with such transfer-
(1)(A) the transferor (or any person related to or designated by the trans-
feror or such person) has received anything of value in connection with such
transfer from the transferee directly or indirectly, or
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would have authorized the IRS to ignore the original gift transfer and
deem the transferor the owner with respect to any gain resulting from the
disposition of the property (by someone else). The proposed § 7701(n)
would have applied if the following conditions were satisfied: (1) the
transferor makes a transfer of property, (2) either (a) the transferor (or
any person related to or designated by the transferor or such person) has
received anything of value in connection with the transfer from the trans-
feree directly or indirectly or (b) there exists an understanding or expec-
tation that the transferor (or such person) will receive anything of value
in connection with the transfer from the transferee directly or indirectly,
and (3) the IRS determines that such treatment is appropriate to prevent
avoidance of the income tax. By its terms, proposed § 7701(n) (1) would
have been applicable only to the transfer-retransfer transaction, (2) did
not require that the transfer and retransfer occur with a prescribed time
period, and (3) did not require built-in gain at the time of the first
transfer.
Enactment of this provision would have raised many immensely diffi-
cult factual questions, including (1) did the transferor (or any other iden-
tified person) receive anything of value directly or indirectly and (2) was
there an understanding or expectation that the transferor (or any other
identified person) would receive something of value directly or indi-
rectly? It appears to me that there would have been considerable uncer-
tainty as to the applicability and scope of the provision. Moreover, this
provision no doubt would have caused distress to taxpayers because the
IRS would have been perceived as asserting it too broadly and inappro-
priately,92 and it would have required significant resources of the IRS to
administer. Although such a statutory rule might have an in terrorem
effect on income shifting, I doubt its viability.
b. Gift as Realization Event
An income shift would not occur as to the built-in gain if the initial
transfer of the appreciated property were to be deemed a realization
event to the transferor. Such a realization-upon-gift rule would be a big
policy change, as well as a big political hurdle, and it could create a liquid-
ity problem to the transferor, who would have to pay an income tax on
the built-in gain at the time of the transfer.93 Given the long-standing
rule to the effect that a gift generally is not realizing event, this anti-abuse
(B) there is an understanding or expectation that the transferor (or such per-
son) will receive anything of value in connection with such transfer from the
transferee directly or indirectly, and
(2) the Secretary determines that such treatment is appropriate to prevent
avoidance of tax imposed by subtitle A.
92. See Buckley, Transfer Tax Repeal Proposals, supra note 7.
93. The liquidity problem could be ameliorated by having the transferor calculate the
gain in the year of the transfer (based on the date of transfer value of the property), but
report the gain and pay tax in future years, perhaps as retransfers are made. The deferred
tax could be subject to an interest charge of some sort. See I.R.C. § 453A(a)(1) (2002). A
deferred reporting of gain and payment of tax strikes me as having the potential for consid-
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mechanism strikes me as unlikely to be implemented. The gift-as-realiza-
tion mechanism (1) would not be applicable only to the transfer-retrans-
fer transaction, (2) would not require that the transfer and retransfer
occur with a prescribed period (indeed, there is no transfer-retransfer re-
quirement) and (3) implicitly would require built-in gain at the time of
the first transfer.
c. Rate Borrowing
Another method by which to reduce the tax advantage of shifting built-
in gain would be to apply the transferor's tax rate to the built-in gain.
The taxable event would not be the initial transfer (as would be the case
with the gift-as-realization rule discussed above); instead, the tax would
be deferred until the subsequent taxable event.
Prior law § 644 (now repealed) provided such a rate-borrowing mecha-
nism with respect to transfers of built-in gain property to a trust. Section
644 prevented any income tax rate advantage with respect to built-in gain
by calculating the tax on the trust by reference to the income tax rates of
the transferor, even though the gain was reported by the trust. Section
644 applied if (1) the trust (or a transferee trust) sold or exchanged the
property within two years of the initial transfer in trust, (2) the property
was disposed of at a gain, and (3) the fair market value of the property at
the time of the initial transfer in trust exceeded the adjusted basis of the
property to the trust immediately after the transfer.94 If applicable, § 644
imposed a special tax on the trust with respect to the "includible gain,"
which was defined by § 644(b) as the lesser of: (1) the gain recognized by
the trust or (2) the excess of (a) the fair market value of the property at
the time of the initial transfer into trust over (b) the adjusted basis of the
property immediately after the transfer. To accomplish the "borrowing"
of the tax rate from the transferor with respect to the includible gain, (1)
the includible gain was removed from the taxable income of the trust and
the remaining taxable income of the trust was taxed at the trust's tax rate,
and (2) the includible gain was taxed according to the transferor's tax
rate. The tax on the includible gain was equal to the excess of (1) the
income tax that would have been imposed on the transferor if the includi-
ble gain had been included in the transferor's gross income over (2) the
income tax actually imposed on the transferor. 95 This "excess of" sub-
traction method of computing the tax causes the transferor's highest mar-
ginal income tax rate (not the average rate) to apply to the includible
gain.
erable complexity. To the extent that the deferral is predicated on a liquidity concern, the
provision might need to coordinate the retransfer amount with the tax due.
94. Section 644(e) provided exceptions for property (1) acquired from a decedent, (2)
acquired by a pooled income fund, (3) acquired by a charitable remainder annuity trust or
a charitable remainder unitrust, and also (4) if the disposition occurred after the death of
the transferor.
95. In addition, § 644(a)(2)(B) provided an annualization rule if the taxable years of
the transferor and the trust were different.
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Section 644 was restricted to property transferred to a trust, but the
§ 644 rate-borrowing concept could be applied more broadly. The rate-
borrowing mechanism could apply to any built-in gain property trans-
ferred for less than full and adequate money's worth consideration (other
than an arm's-length bad bargain). 96 The scope of the provision could be
restricted to trusts or defined related persons such as family members,
but applying the provision to any such transfer to any person (other than
a charitable organization) might discourage use of a non-related person
for temporary income shifting and would avoid complexities in defining
related persons.
A rate-borrowing provision could exempt some small dollar transfer
and retransfer amounts from its scope. The exemption amount might
take the form of an annual amount and/or a cumulative lifetime amount.
To avoid over-inclusion of transactions within the rate-borrowing
mechanism, its scope might be limited to apply only if all requirements
for application of the provision occur within a prescribed time period.
For example, § 644 required that the taxable event, the disposition of the
property by the trust, occur within two years of the transfer to the trust.
Congress has used other time periods that might be relevant: (1)
§ 1022(d)(1)(C) uses a three-year period for purposes of identifying
transfers that do not qualify for step-up in basis under § 1022(b) and
§ 1022(C) 97 and (2) the § 1014(e) rule, which negates a step up with re-
spect to near-to-death transfers, uses a one-year rule. The longer the
time period, the more effective (and probably unpopular) the provision
would be.
(1) Apply rate-borrowing mechanism to transfer-retransfer transaction.
A technical problem with implementing a time period requirement with
respect to the transfer-retransfer transaction is determination of the taxa-
ble event; is it (1) the taxable disposition by the transferee or (2) the
retransfer to the transferor? Conceptually, the event that should invoke
the rate-borrowing mechanism (which is predicated on the occurrence of
each of (1) transfer of built-in gain property, (2) disposition by the trans-
feree, and (3) retransfer) should be the last to occur of the required
events. If the taxable disposition by the transferee and the retransfer oc-
cur in the same taxable year, the rate-borrowing device will work as de-
scribed. If the retransfer were to occur in a taxable year before the
taxable disposition by the transferee, the rate-borrowing device will work
as described in the year of the disposition.
If the retransfer were to occur in a taxable year after the taxable dispo-
sition by the transferee, however, the transferee would be required to
report the gain in the year of the taxable disposition without application
96. See Comm'r v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303 (1945); Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8. The provi-
sion also might except property (1) acquired from a decedent, (2) acquired by a pooled
income fund, (3) acquired by a charitable remainder annuity trust or a charitable remain-
der unitrust, and also (4) if the disposition occurred after the death of the transferor. See
I.R.C. § 644(e) (2002).
97. See supra text accompanying note 45 (discussing § 1022(b), (c)).
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of the rate-borrowing mechanism. In the subsequent taxable year during
which the retransfer occurs, the conditions for application of the rate-
borrowing mechanism would be satisfied, but the gain would have been
reported previously and taxed according to the circumstances of the
transferee. To apply the rate-borrowing mechanism in this situation
would require either (1) an amended return for the transferee for the
year during which the gain was reported or (2) a device by which to in-
crease the tax of the transferee for the year of the retransfer (to reflect
the increase in tax that would have resulted if the rate-borrowing mecha-
nism had applied in the prior year of the disposition). Neither option
seems appealing.
Another complication associated with a rate-borrowing mechanism
triggered by the transfer-retransfer transaction is that extensive reporting
requirements would be necessary for enforcement of the provision.
Every gift transfer of cash and property in kind by a taxpayer would have
to be reported (except to the extent of any exemption provided and not
with respect to a transfer to a charitable organization). 98
98. For example, H.R. 8 (2001) contained a new reporting provision, proposed § 6019,
that would have required reporting by the transferor of gifts during a calendar year in
excess of $25,000, but the provision was not enacted into law. The text of the proposal is as
follows:
SEC. 6019. RETURNS RELATING TO LARGE LIFETIME GIFTS.
(a) IN GENERAL-If the value of the aggregate gifts of property made
by an individual to any United States person during a calendar year ex-
ceeds $25,000, such individual shall make a return for such year setting
forth-
(1) the name and TIN of the donee,
(2) an accurate description of such property,
(3) the adjusted basis of such property in the hands of the donor at the
time of the gift,
(4) the donor's holding period for such property,
(5) sufficient information to determine whether any gain on the sale of
the property would be treated as ordinary income, and
(6) such other information as the Secretary may by regulations
prescribe.
(b) EXCEPTIONS- Subsection (a) shall not apply to-
(1) CASH- Any gift of cash.
(2) GIFTS TO CHARITY- Any gift to an organization described in sec-
tion 501(c) and exempt from tax under section 501(a) but only if no
interest in the property is held for the benefit of any person other than
such an organization.
(3) WAIVER OF CERTAIN PENSION RIGHTS individual waives
[sic], before the death of a participant, any survivor benefit, or right to
such benefit, under section 401(a)(11) or 417, subsection (a) shall not
apply to such waiver.
(4) REPORTING ELSEWHERE- Any gift required to be reported to
the Secretary under any other provision of this title.
(c) STATEMENTS TO BE FURNISHED TO CERTAIN PERSONS-
Every person required to make a return under subsection (a) shall furnish
to each person whose name is required to be set forth in such return a
written statement showing-
(1) the name, address, and phone number of the person required to
make such return, and
(2) the information specified in subsection (a) with respect to property
received by the person required to receive such statement.
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(2) Apply rate-borrowing mechanism without requiring a retransfer.
Because application of the rate-borrowing mechanism to the transfer-re-
transfer transaction raises complicating issues, a more restrictive rate-bor-
rowing rule may be appropriate. Application of the rate-borrowing
mechanism would be considerably simplified if it were to be applied to
any transfer of built-in gain property, regardless of whether a retransfer
occurs. This more restricted scope for the rate-borrowing technique
would cause it to apply if (1) the transferee (or a further transferee) sold
or exchanged the property within a prescribed period of time of the initial
transfer and (2) the fair market value of the property at the time of the
initial transfer exceeded the adjusted basis of the property to the trans-
feree immediately after the transfer. Such a rate-borrowing device would
be very similar in concept to § 644, but it would expand the scope of
§ 644, which applied only to a transfer in trust, to include any transfer for
less than full and adequate money's worth consideration other than (1) an
arm's-length bad bargain, (2) a transfer to a charitable organization, and
(3) any transfer within prescribed exempt amount/s.
Mandatory high tax rate on built-in gain. Another relatively simple de-
vice to negate the income tax advantage of shifting built-in gain would be
to tax any built-in gain recognized by the transferee within a prescribed
period of time at a mandatory high rate of tax. This would avoid the
computational complexities and tax-return-information sharing that § 644
required.
To summarize the foregoing anti-abuse mechanisms, the transfer-re-
transfer transaction is the most deserving of a special anti-abuse rule, but
any mechanism tailored to the transfer-retransfer transaction would re-
quire a fairly complex statutory provision, the crafting of which would be
a challenge. A less complex rate-borrowing technique would be activated
if the transferee were to sell the built-in gain property at a gain within the
prescribed period of time, regardless of any retransfer. This less complex
solution is not ideal, as it includes within its reach not just the abusive
transfer-retransfer transaction; it also would apply to any transfer of
built-in gain property, regardless of whether a retransfer occurred. To
ameliorate this over-inclusion, annual or lifetime exclusion amounts
could remove a significant majority of transactions from the provision.
Left within the scope of the no-retransfer-required rate-borrowing provi-
sion would be large dollar built-in gain transactions.
2. Dealing with Trusts
Possible mechanisms to thwart the use of trusts to accomplish income
tax savings through income shifting would include (1) treating any trust as
a grantor trust unless it explicitly provides that the settlor cannot at any
time be a beneficiary of the trust and (2) mandatory imposition of the
The written statement required under the preceding sentence shall be furnished on or
before January 31 of the year following the calendar year for which the return under sub-
section (a) was required to be made.
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highest possible § 1 tax rate with respect to property received within a
prescribed time period of sale by the trust.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The logical incongruity of repealing the estate tax and the generation-
skipping transfer tax, while retaining a gift tax, suggests to me the Con-
gress should revisit the question of retaining the gift tax. If the concern of
Congress with respect to complete repeal of the transfer tax system was
income tax abuse, then Congress should (1) enact provisions within the
income tax to deal with the abuses and (2) repeal the gift tax. The anti-
abuse provisions should avoid needless complexity and should give the
IRS sufficient authority and resources to prevent the income-shifting
abuses. Any anti-abuse provision that is restricted to the transfer-retrans-
fer transaction (the income-shifting abuse transaction so widely bantered
about during congressional consideration of transfer tax repeal) is likely
to be very complex and probably difficult for the IRS to enforce. Provi-
sions targeted more narrowly at transfers of built-in gain property (in ex-
cess of exemption amounts), regardless of whether a retransfer occurs,
would be relatively simple in operation (and administration) and may be
an adequate surrogate for a more precise mechanism.
If the foregoing income tax anti-abuse mechanisms seem cumbersome
(due to the technical and policy issues discussed above), perhaps an ac-
ceptable tax regime would rely on either (1) an accessions base or (2)
inclusion of gratuitous transfers in the income tax base, and for these sub-
jects I commend Professor Dodge's article for edification.
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